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INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL
Volume XVII

August, 1942

Number 6

U1he Walter TJ.Creanor -Memal s
At the regular term of the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit the following Memorial
Resolutions were presented on April 14th, 1942.
Mr. Patrick J. Smith of Indianapolis, Indiana, on behalf of
the members of the Bar of this Court, addressed the
Court as follows:
On behalf of the Bar of this Court, leave is asked to
present the following resolution:
RESOLVED, That the members of the Bar of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
express their deep regret at the death of Walter Emanuel
Treanor, late Judge of this Court, and desire to record their
appreciation of his high character and of his outstanding
public service to his fellowmen, his state and nation.
He was born on November 7, 1883, at Loogootee, Indiana, the son of James Donnelly Treanor and Gertrude Sommers Treanor.
He began his public service prior to World War I as a
teacher in the public schools at Petersburg, Indiana.
In 1912 he was graduated with honors from Indiana
University with the Bachelor of Arts degree.
From 1912 to 1915 he served as principal of the Petersburg School. He became superintendent of the school in
1915, and served as such until 1917, when he enlisted in the
Armed Forces of the United States, and thereafter served
overseas with the rank of Lieutenant.
(477)
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On December 9, 1916, he was married to Aline Elizabeth
Jean, who with their daughter, Rosemary, survives.
After his discharge from the Army he entered law school.
He received the Bachelor of Laws degree from Indiana University in 1922 and the degree of Doctor of Laws in 1923.
He held a professorship of law at Indiana University
School of Law from 1922 to 1930. During the school year
1926-1927, Judge Treanor studied at Harvard College of
Law, and in 1927 the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science
was conferred upon him.
He edited the Indiana Law Journal from 1927 to 1930.
In the latter year he was elected to a judgeship on the Indiana Supreme Court. After serving one six-year term, he
was re-elected in 1936. On December 27, 1937, he was appointed to this Court where he served until his death on
April 26, 1941.
Throughout his life Judge Treanor was a man of high
courage. He was unafraid. While on the Indiana Supreme
Court his liberal views found expression in strong dissenting
opinions. Later majority opinions have accepted many of
his views.
He respected the principle of stare decisis, but did
not believe the law static. It was a growing concept ever
changing to meet the need of expanding social consciousness.
His intellectual and moral qualities, tolerance, breadth
of vision and personal charm endeared him forever to his
fellowmen. His service to his state and nation will cause
him to be remembered always.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Bar of the Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals now presents to the Court a portrait of Judge Walter Emanuel Treanor as a permanent
memorial to a great man and a great jurist; that a copy of
this resolution also be presented to the Court with a request
it be appropriately spread upon the, Court's records, and
that the Chairman of the Bar's Committee provide the family of Judge Treanor with a copy thereof.
Submitted by the Committee on Resolutions.
PATRICK J. SMITH, Chairman
CASPER W. OOMS
MYRON H. GRAY
KENNETH F. BURGESS
B. HowARD CAUGHRAN
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Mr. Charles P. Megan, of Chicago, Illinois, addressed the
Court as follows:
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

We have come together to welcome the assurance given
us that future generations of lawyers and judges will know
the features of this judge, what manner of man he was to
the sight. The painter has raised his work to the high level
of art, and we are happy that one whom we so admired has
been nobly pictured for all men to see.
It is not easy for us here in Illinois to speak of the life
and work of Judge Treanor. We never knew Walter Treanor
the school-teacher, Walter Treanor the Phi Beta Kappa college student, Walter Treanor the law professor, Walter
Treanor the State Supreme Court judge. More than that, we
but only knew the Walter Treanor of this portrait. For
he was with us only three years, and when he came to us
the hand of death was already on him, although we knew it
not, nor perhaps did he.
We record all this with grief and a deep sense of loss.
It means that our personal acquaintance with him was not
great, and that for closer knowledge we must go to the
printed word, which does not tell all.
Walter Treanor was first in point of time, and possibly
first in temperament and by choice, a teacher. He began
teaching in that town in southwestern Indiana, not his birthplace, but which he always thought of as his home, where he
himself had attended school, the county seat of Pike County,
in the second tier of counties from the Ohio River and but
one county removed from the Wabash, enshrined in Indiana
song and story. Petersburg must be not far from the center
of that great undefined territory,---called by a name whose
origin is unknown, the good word "Hoosier,"-which, we are
told, once reached across the Ohio into Kentucky, and deep
into Illinois, comprising all the earlier Lincoln country. Indeed Lincoln spent the great formative years of his life, the
fourteen years between seven and twenty-one, in this southwestern corner of Indiana. We begin then with Walter
Treanor as a Hoosier schoolmaster, a title endeared to all
the world by Edward Eggleston's famous book; grade teacher in 1902, high school teacher of Latin and history for the
next eight years (he never lost his love for either Latin or
history), principal of the high school from 1912 to 1915,
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and superintendent of schools from 1915 to 1917. Then
came the World War, and he went to France as a soldier, at
thirty-five years of age. Returning to the United States in
1919 he began the study of law at thirty-six, and graduated
in 1922. Later he had a year of graduate study at the Harvard Law School.
From 1922 to 1930, with that one year out, he was a
professor at Indiana University, teaching law and continuing
to coach athletic teams (now with some difficulty because of
a bad knee that developed out of his war service), and we are
told that he was a very popular figure on the campus, as he
naturally liked everybody, and everybody liked him.
Here we begin to learn what he was thinking about, for
in this period he wrote a few comments for the Indiana Law
Journal, which was founded after he joined the law faculty.
In volume one, number one (January, 1926) we have what is,
I believe, the first of Walter Treanor's writings generally
available to the profession-a four-page note giving a clear
and lawyer-like exposition of a problem connected with the
law of burden of proof, a field which today still furnishes
difficulties for the highest Courts on either side of the Atlantic Ocean. In the next month's issue, Professor Treanor
analyzed the "family purpose" doctrine in automobile accident
cases, in an attempt to put the doctrine in its proper social
and economic setting. In a note on a new point in agency,
in the Journal for March, 1928, Professor Treanor challenged
an opinion of the Indiana Appellate Court, gave the substance
of the supporting cases clearly and succinctly, and concluded
by saying boldly that "the members of the Indiana bar are
entitled to a fuller and more adequate consideration, by the
Supreme or Appellate Court, of the soundness of the agency
doctrine" announced in the decision.
In the December, 1929, number of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review there is a review by Professor
Treanor of a new case-book on suretyship. He discusses the
change in the concept, and quotes an English judge's statement in 1876 about the rule that a surety is released by a
binding extension of time, however short, and regardless of
damages, the English judge saying frankly that this rule
was "consistent with neither justice nor common sense," but
that the rule had been generally established so long that it
could only be altered by the legislature; and Professor
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Treanor contrasts this with the opinion of an American
State Supreme Court, forty years later: "We hold that the
extension of time of payment, unless resultant harm is
shown, does not discharge a paid surety," suggests that the
old rule is yielding under the strain of "men's actions and
men's needs"; and concludes, jurist and teacher speaking
together with one voice:
There ought to be a clearer appreciation on the part of
ihe student that as the facts of life change, becomming more
and more complex, legal doctrines must also change, must
grow and expand, or else die. For it is true of suretyship
law, as well as of law generally, that "the law must be stable,
and yet it cannot stand still."

Here in 1929 we see the influence of his mentor Dean Pound,
and a foreshadowing of his own judicial philosophy.
Then suddenly, out of a clear sky, he was asked to become a candidate for the Supreme Court of the State, and
he agreed, and was nominated and elected: a very portent,
a Democrat on the Indiana Supreme Court! This was in
the fall of 1930, and he took his seat on the bench early in
January, 1931, only eight and a half years after graduating
from law school. He was now forty-eight years old. Almost
at once he was plunged into a distressing and most controversial case, which had divided the Court already, and was
ultimately ruled on by a divided court. Thus early he had
experience of something which was an outstanding part of
his life for all his later years. For his career shows a baffling
admixture of the things that Fortune sends. All of his advances in the world came unsought, perhaps not greatly desired, perhaps not desired at all. It may well be that of the
different branches of his life's work he loved teaching best,
and very likely he would have been happy as school superintendent in small cities, moving from one to another as
Methodist ministers do, advancing a little in his profession,
satisfied to be where he was, each time half regretting the
change. He did not like political life, and on the day he first
went on the bench in 1931 he gave up politics forever. On
the other hand, the bench for him was not a quiet haven,
where the storms of professional life were past. No, it was
just the opposite. From his boyhood he seems to have been
destined for a minority status. (As for his religious experience, it may be sufficient to say that his earliest child-
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hood years appear to have paralleled those of another eminent
mid-western judge, Chief Justice Ryan of Wisconsin.)
It
was not that he was fond of differing from others: on the
contrary, hating nothing but intolerance, he was of that
gentle nature to which dissent brings for the time an agony
of mind, one instinct fighting against another, a deep longing for harmonious, unified, effective action, with all forces
pulling together, pitted against an unbending loyalty to principle. So, while all his life, it might almost be said, he was
in a minority, yet he was constantly invited upward; taking
the lowest place at the table, till one came and said: Friend,
go up higher. This is the life that it was given him to live,
for better or for worse.
Cardinal Newman helped the thinking of his contemporaries by writing a "Grammar of Assent," but no one has
attempted to compose a Grammar of Dissent. Dissent is not
calculated by the arithmetical process of counting up opinions. Physicists tell us that if two objects in the depths of
space were found yesterday a certain distance apart, and
today a greater distance, it is largely a matter of arbitrary
convention whether We shall say that A has moved away
from B, or that B has moved away from A. A distinguished
legal scholar, who has written acutely on the philosophy of
judicial dissent, is now a member of the Supreme Court of
the United States, and is found now as one of a majority and
now of a minority, and we speculate whether he has remained
fixed and the Court has moved from side to side, or he has
moved and the Court has remained constant. Of the details
of all this the bar knows little. "The intimacies of the conference room," says the scholar-judge to whom reference
has just been made, " . . . are illuminations denied to
the historian. And it is not easy to disentangle individual influences in the combined work of a Court. . . . Divisions
on the Court and the greater clarity of view and candor of
expression to which they give rise, are especially productive
of insight. Moreover, much life may be found to stir beneath
even the decorous surface of unanimous opinions."
"The
considerations" (he goes on to say) "that move a judge to
yield concurrence in an opinion reaching an approved result
through uncongenial doctrine are among the most teasing
mysteries to a student of the Supreme Court. Long-term
strategy or immediate fatigue, hopelessness of opposition or
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depreciation of the importance of the pronouncement, bonhommie of common labors or avoidance of undue division,such are the factors that may restrain the expression of individual views."
Be all this as it may, Judge Treanor on the Supreme
Court of Indiana felt it his duty to advocate that which he
thought right and just, although at times others could
not be brought to accept his views. When the United States
Supreme Court confirmed his dissent, as in the Anderson
case, involving security of tenure for teachers, or the J. D.
Adams Manufacturing Co. case, involving the validity of the
Indiana Gross Income Tax Law with reference to receipts,
from interstate commerce, his mild spirit probably felt no
elation, but only a passing shadow of regret that there
could not have been agreement from the outset. Yet he had
achieved what is said to be the crowning glory of the State
Supreme Court judge who dissents from the decision of his
fellow-judges, and thereafter has his views sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States: the stone that was
rejected of the builders became the head of the corner.
Perhaps I should mention here the cases of injunctions
restraining parties from filing personal injury suits against
railroads in States remote from the scene of the accident.
State Courts sometimes asserted the right to issue such injunctions, but the contrary view was announced by Judge
Treanor for his Court in 1937, and this is the view that has
been accepted by the United States Supreme Court, in two
very recent cases.
Few men of Judge Treanor's eminence on the bench have
grasped so firmly and maintained so unswervingly the doctrine that what we live by is justice according to law. And
so to this gentle and warm-hearted scholar the parties to the
law-suit tended to recede into the background, and the
principle of law to take the place it should occupy, the foremost place, for this is a government of laws and not of men.
Humanitarian as he was, to the core, yet he had schooled
himself to think of the law first, and persons afterwards, and
this is one of the elements that constitute the judge: hard
cases make bad law. The world would be a poorer place without the crusader for social and economic reform, but his
place is not on the bench. And as in Eggleston's book the
novelist that'was in him (it has been said) overcame the

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

['Vol. 17

preacher that was also in him, so the jurist in Walter Treanor
got the upper hand of the sentimentalist; and that was well.
Yet at this stage of his career, as all his life, he was
swimming against the current. He came on the bench at a
time when the most prominent and influential members of
the bar of the whole country were turning to the Courts and
calling upon them to curb the actions of legislatures, State
and national. The opinion which probably was the last that
Judge Treanor delivered from the bench in Indiana, shows
how different was his view from some of the then-current
expressions of sentiment of the bar. The subject-matter of
the case was a painful one-divorce for insanity: the opinion
ends with this clear brief statement of the relation between
legislative power and the power of Courts with reference
thereto:
Courts are bound to declare the law to be that which the
General Assembly, acting within its constitutional power, enacts, be it wise or foolish as measured by our personal views,
and even though it shocks our sense of justice and fairness.

This is very reminiscent of another of his masters, Holmes.
We are now approaching the end of Judge Treanor's
service on the Supreme Court of Indiana. But one occurrence
within this seven-year period must be noticed. It was the
Harvard Tercentenary. In 1936 the first-born of American
universities commemorated the three centuries of its life, and
scholars were in attendance from all parts of the world.
Among the law alumni invited was the Indiana scholar, with
ten years of experience, not quite half of these as a law professor, more than half as a judge. It was to him a congenial
gathering, expansive and progressive, a last term at school
for one who never ceased to be a learner. The subject of the
three-day celebration at the Harvard Law School was "The
Future of the Common Law." A judge of the highest Court
of England was, one of the principal speakers. Summing up
his own address Lord Wright said:
The common law is a living organism, and will, I believe,
go on living and developing in the service of the cause of
justice, maintaining its old tradition of deciding concrete cases
on their merits and according to law on precedent or on the
analogy of precedent except where a statute governs. . .
But . . . it will be less concerned with the literal interpretation and reconciliation, in a narrow and technical spirit, of decided cases. The judges will think more of the spirit of the de-
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cisions and will strive to mold and control them so as to serve
the exigencies of social welfare and justice.

Then Justice Stone, now Chief Justice of the United
States, took up the story. He said:
Whether the constitutional standard of reasonableness of
official action is subjective, that of the judge who must decide, or objective in terms of a considered judgment of what
the community may regard as within the limits of the reasonable, is a question which the cases have not specifically decided. .
. The judge whose decision may control government
action, as well as in deciding questions of private law, must
ever be alert to discover . . . whether his own or the objective standard will represent the sober second thought
of the community, which is the firm base on which all law
must ultimately rest.

The learned Justice, after expressing "faith in the capacity of the common-law system to find adequate solutions
of the problems of public and private law in a rapidly changing order," concluded as follows:
That faith must be inspired, not so much by the earlier
history of the common law in America, as by its present, and
by those unmistakable signs, which one may observe on every
hand, of what its future is to be. . . . Despite the narrow
and pedantic views which have at times retarded the progress
of the common law and obscured our vision of its vital and
essential qualities, at no stage of its history has it seemed
to give such promise of carrying forward triumphantly the
extraordinary task we have assigned to it.

Late in the afternoon of the third day of this great
symposium Judge Treanor was called on for his comments.
He was a prophet, a seer of the future, but his Indiana
brethern tell us that notwithstanding his academic background they always thought of him as a very practical man.
So he spoke at Harvard:
Legal rules, principles, standards, and concepts, which
reasonably secured the economic liberty and welfare of the
individual a few decades ago, may prove to be inadequate
when applied to the corresponding problems of today ..
The result has been that many types of anti-social conduct have flourished because of the inherent limitations upon
the capacity of both courts and legislatures to deal with
situations which require individual treatment . . . and the test
of abuse of discretion [by an administrative body] should be
a genuine judicial test and not a test measured by the in-
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dividual judge's ideas of the expediency of the administrative
determination.

Thus he hoped that
the profession [bench and bar]
indispensable contribution to the
of justice in accordance with law
society with its ever increasingly
nomic life.

may continue to make its
problem of administration
in our politically organized
complicated social and eco-

"It is this aptitude of the common law" (said Judge
Crane of New York as a final word), "this adaptability, this
facing of present-day facts, which give it such power and
usefulness."
This was the spirit in which Walter Treanor judged men
and causes, as he sat for seven years on the highest Court
of his native State. A member of his bar has written of him:
He was a thoroughly independent thinker, with a strong
tendency to brush away refinements and get at the actual
merits of questions. . . . He was eminently fair, and unquestionably one of the finest characters who ever came to the
supreme bench of our State.

We may perhaps convey to others some picture of Judge
Treanor if we say that in his dignity of presence, his mild
disposition, his uncompromising rectitude, his learning, he
recalled to the minds of lawyers a great judge of an earlier
day, Joseph Story.
Then, in 1938, unsought, as always, came his appointment to this Court, with its great sweep of power which we
call jurisdiction,and its great record of service to the public.
When Walter Treanor reached us here in Illinois, he
came into an atmosphere he knew well, an atmosphere of
conservatism. It was mundus alter et idem, another world,
and yet the same. The prevailing opinion of the bar tended
to the sustaining of the status quo; but in the age-old antinomy of stability and change, what sets a man on one side
rather than the other it is for the philosopher to explain, or
the novelist, who looks into the hearts of men. In any
event, Judge Treanor's days of dissent were not over. The
gad-fly of principle still drove him, and would drive him as
long as life should last. As one of his colleagues has said of
all his colleagues, they were judges "possessing great independence of thought and holding varied political and economic views." That the novus ordo seclorum should change
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all else, and leave Courts the same, was not to be expected.
Judges are not all printed off one plate, and there was room
for a Walter Treanor: he had his own place on the Court,
and this his fellow-judges recognized in generous friendship.
We at the bar followed his career with deep interest,
all of us greatly desiring to know what manner of man had
come among us to sit on the judgment-seat.
He gave us the clue at once. At a dinner tendered to him
by the Chicago Bar Association upon his coming to Chicago
there was much life and gaiety, but at the very end of his
remarks in response and acknowledgement he dropped a few
words of serious thought, from which we had it confirmed
that the new judge was a historian and legal scholar, with
perhaps as much of the statesman's point of view as it is lawful for a judge to have. Speaking without notes, he said to
us, very simply and informally:
"After all, there is a community, a brotherhood of ideas
and a common background that makes us always feel at home
with each other. Indeed it is a very interesting thing to me to
realize that, after all, you and I could talk familiarly and understandingly with the members of our profession who lived
and worked two hundred, three hundred, five hundred years
ago, a thing of great significance, after all, because it is a
recognition, when we think of that, of the continuity of the
thinking, a recognition of the continued soundness of the
views,--the traditions and the ideals of our profession. We
could talk familiarly and understandingly with Coke" [I well
remember this occasion: scholar as the Judge was, he pronounced the name 'Cook,' as the bearer of the name did, and
every one else of the time], "the tough old common-law lawyer
who thought that equity and all such things were a ruinous
innovation that was going to destroy the beautiful symmetry of
the common law. We could understand Bacon, too, and the
other upholders of the great new idea, because, after all, their
conflict was the same conflict that was going on and will continue to go on between the opposing principles, or really the
opposing ideas of government by laws, as against government
by discretion alone, or government by men; the administrative
activity or function in government as distinguished from what
we call the strictly judicial. And we could imagine Coke and
Bacon and others, if they were here with us today, violently
disagreeing, just as we do in our profession, on many of the
things and many of the problems that confront us. And as we
look back we have none of the bitterness in respect to the
views of those men, because we realize now that there was
merit in the conceptions, the ideas, of both, that it would
have been disastrous to the growth and development of law
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and of political societies with which we are familiar if either
one had lost, but it would have been equally ruinous if either
one had supplanted entirely and excluded the other. And
so today perhaps we have a deeper feeling of brotherhood
and appreciation when we realize that we do find ourselves
differing sometimes as bitterly as the men of old differed in
our profession, and it may be that in the future as men look
back they will see that there was good in even the most antagonistic positions and ideas of today. So I look forward in
the hope of having a small part along with you in meeting and
deciding, solving some of these problems which confront us and
which are as serious as the ones which confronted the men
of our profession in days gone by. If we can solve our problems as they solved theirs, we will perform a service which
not only will reflect credit and honor upon our profession,
but will add to the enduring of those traditional ideas of
democratic government to which we are all devoted."

Such was Judge Treanor's first word to the bar of Chicago.
From this point on, it would have seemed that we here
would have an opportunity of closer personal acquaintance
with our new judge. But this was not to be. Indeed, Judge
Treanor had but three more years of life before him. Gentle
and kindly as ever, he yet retired more and more into the
life of the student of law and its application to the affairs
of men, a wide and great field, in truth, but more and more
he plowed it alone, a solitary furrow. We continued to know
him almost entirely from his opinions as delivered publicly
in the cases that were argued before him.
But this is scarcely unique. Every judge of a reviewing
court is known best in this way. Every opinion delivered is
a fragment of a judge's autobiography, and for him, as indeed for all of us, there is (said Ruskin) no one final day
of judgment; "every day is a day of judgment, and writes its
irrevocable verdict in the flame of its west." This judgment,
this verdict, Walter Treanor could await with quiet confidence. Integer vitae, scelerisque purus, this school-master
taught us something more than law. Above all, he did what
alone is straitly required of man: to do justly, and to love
mercy, and to walk humbly with his God. In some sense he
was here, as elsewhere for all his life, a stranger in a strange
land, but there went before him by day a pillar of cloud, to
lead him the way, and by night a pillar of fire, as the Lord
promised, and he walked unafraid.
As a judge he won the trust and affection of his colleagues and of the bar. He gave judgment firmly, directly,
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but always temperately and with kindness. Even in dissenting opinions, which (says Justice Frankfurter, whom I have
already quoted) "have an impetus of individuality which
makes expression freer"-we quite understand what the
learned Justice means,--even in Judge Treanor's dissents the
reader will search in vain for the slightest touch of asperity,
for the least hint of rhetoric or heat. In the course of his
long dissent in the controversial Fansteel case, he permitted
himself to go no farther than this:
It is urged that an affirmance of the order of the Board
is an approval of the unlawful acts of the employees. I understand the emotional appeal involved in that contention,
but cannot comprehend its relation to a judicial consideration
of the question before us.

"In Judge Treanor's work," wrote a colleague on this
Court, "he carefully weighed and appraised conflicting values.
But the result was always the product of the thinker."
His three years on the federal bench slipped quickly by.
To the end he dissented freely, for his whole life was
grounded in principle. This is a point of conduct that every
man must decide for himself. Obviously Judge Treanor
(with James Russell Lowell) believed that compromise makes
a good umbrella but a bad roof. It is all in one's judgment
of values, as his colleague observed. Who shall say that
Judge Treanor's was not thoughtful and sincere? He went
below the surface rubbish, below the shifting sands, deep
down to the bed-rock. And yet, in this his life of paradoxes,
he was the gentlest, the mildest, the most modest and selfeffacing of men.
With all this, he had a singularly happy life. He died
too soon, but his whole life was such that in the evening of
any day he might have drawn his mantle about him and
lain down for the last, long sleep, at peace with the world
and himself. His name in our jurisprudence will grow ever
greater. We shall see him more clearly as the years go on,
and understand him better . Shall we not think of that as a
foretaste of immortality? His body was borne to earth at
Petersburg. It was his own home town, but he was a citizen
too of the city not built with hands. His was a culture that
is not foreign to our local soil, but indigenous, genuine, rooted
in life; yet he was of kin, not only to the great spirits of this
middle west, but to those of other lands and other times:
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Hence in a season of calm weather,
Though inland far we be,
Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
Which brought us hither;
Can in a moment travel thither,
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.
Judge, teacher, scholar, saint-we grieve at our loss.
But we are proud and glad that Walter Treanor lived and
worked among us. He has left us a precious memory, and
we shall look on his face, as the artist has so well portrayed
him, and remember him, and take courage and hope for all
the years to come.
Mr. Smith then introduced Mr. Carl Wilde:
May I now present Mr. Carl Wilde, representing the
Indiana Bar, whose address will conclude the Bar's Memorial
Presentation.
Mr. Carl Wilde, of Indianapolis, Indiana, addressed the
Court as follows:
It is a high privilege indeed to be permitted to appear
in this presence, to speak, on behalf of the lawyers of Indiana,
in honor of a man who was held in such affectionate esteem
by the entire bar of Indiana as was Judge Treanr.
A native of Indiana; a graduate of her State University; a teacher in her public schools, and a professor of law
at that university; a judge of her Supreme Court; and a lifetime resident of Indiana; Walter Emanuel Treanor was
thoroughly a Hoosier. He possessed those homely qualities
which we like to think of as being typically Hoosier: honesty, simplicity, industry, and loyalty. As is traditional with
many of our eminent Hoosier lawyers and judges (and the
same may be said of those of the other states in this circuit)
he was a school teacher before he was a lawyer. He had an
instinct and a gift for teaching. The profession of the
teacher was dear to his heart; and after he left his desk at
the law school at Indiana University to begin his career as
a jurist, and throughout that brilliant career, he continued
to be a member of the faculty, having always in his mind the
thought that some day he might resume again his beloved
vocation as a teacher of the law.
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Judge Treanor had truly great qualities of heart, and
mind, and soul, but it never occurred to him that he possessed
these qualities, and he was as simple and kindly and unaffected in all he said and did as only such men who are
wholly unaware of their greatness can be. No man was ever
less pretentious than he was. He had not that need of assuming a front of dignity to impress the world, which is so
frequently the resort of lesser men, unsure of themselves or
conscious of a lack of the ability required by their task. Dignity he had, innate and with no conscious thought, arising
solely out of a disinterested singleness of purpose-to administer the law with regard to no considerations other than the
attainment of justice as exact as the imperfections of human
nature and of the vehicle of our legal system would permit.
To Judge Treanor the law was never static. He regarded
it as a constantly growing and expanding system, susceptible
always of improvement, and sufficiently flexible to meet the
changing needs of our political, social, and industrial economy.
It happened that by political party membership Judge
Treanor was a Democrat. He was, also, upon principle and
by conviction, a devoted follower of the democratic doctrine
to which all lovers of liberty under the law, regardless of
political party affiliation, subscribe, that is: he believed that
before the law all men are equal, and that to maintain such
equality the mere undiscriminating application of the strict
letter of a statute or a legal principle, without regard to
their spirit and intent, will not suffice.
In his philosophical approach to legal problems Judge
Treanor was undoubtedly of that school of thought generally
called "liberal." Yet, even the most devoted adherent of the
so-called "conservative" school could never entertain any
doubt of the absolute integrity of thought and the honesty
of purpose which actuated Judge Treanor in every decision
which he made, both while on the Indiana Supreme Court
and on this Bench. His liberal views were to him the
necessary corollary to his conviction that our system of law
is a growing, expanding one, adaptable to a changing economic and social world, elastic enough to insure against the
unyielding ridigity which stifles growth. His liberalism had
no taint of the fanatic; nor had he any of the ruthlessness
which characterizes the zealot. He was careful always to
avoid as much as possible the hardship which so frequently
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results from a reversal of established and accepted rule. One
of his best known decisions is In Re Todd, 208 Indiana 168,
wherein he held constitutional an Act of Indiana General
Assembly giving the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction
to admit attorneys to practice under such rules and regulations as it might prescribe. The question directly presented
was whether the state constitution had been amended by
the striking of the provision entitling all persons of good
moral character, qualified to vote, to admission to practice
law in all courts of justice. A majority of the electors who
voted upon the amendment favored its adoption, but the
number of those voting in favor of the amendment was much
less than half the number of voters who cast their votes for
political candidates at the general election in which the question of the proposed constitutional amendment was submitted. The Indiana Supreme Court had previously held, in
a number of decisions, (with strong dissent in some of them)
that a proposed amendment which is submitted to the electors
at a general election fails of adoption unless it is approved
by a majority of all those voting in such general election.
Judge Treanor, a majority of the court concurring, reversed
this rule, holding that where the overruling of previous decisions of the Supreme Court will not produce uncertainty
in titles, or introduce doubt and confusion in questions of
property or contract, it is the duty of the court to correct
its own errors, and the doctrine of stare decisis cannot be
successfully invoked to perpetuate them. Using the simple,
lucid language which he habitually employed, Judge Treanor
said:
"When the overruling of previous decisions involves only
a question of public interest in no way affecting private interests the rule of stare decisis does not control."

As a result of the decision in the Todd case, Indiana,
which had previously borne the reproach of having to admit
to the practice of law all persons of good moral character
who had attained their majority although they might possess
none of the other essential qualitifications, and whose courts
had been compelled to resort to various subterfuges in an
attempt to exclude unqualified persons, was enabled to take
its place in the front rank of those states which have set the
highest standards for admission to the bar.
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It is apparent from the opinions written by Judge Treanor
that he stood always upon the conviction that the law and
the functions of lawyers and judges are always to be so
coalesced and used, that the end achieved will be the doing
of justice. The idea that the instrumentalities of our legal
system could be used to foster oppression, to satisfy greed, to
promote chicanery; this was to him abhorrent and intolerable. I think that the words ascribed to Richelieu in the
play by Lord Bulwer-Lytton, might much more aptly have
been said by Judge Treanor:
"For justice all place a temple,
and all season, summer!"
Many men are born imbued with a deep love of liberty.
More rarely, but still frequently, they come into this world
possessed of an instinctive hatred of injustice. Much more
rarely, they have that fine sense of perception and logical
analysis which we usually refer to as the "legal mind" and
which invariably marks the great lawyer. When all of these
qualities happen to be combined in one man, we have a great
judge. Judge Treanor had these qualities; they made him
a great judge. His monument, more enduring than bronze
or stone, is built of his decisions which appear in the reports of the Indiana Supreme Court and of this Court; and,
long after all of us present here today have passed into the
beyond, that monument will stand to attest his greatness and
will still point the way of oncoming generations of lawyers
and judges to the just application of the rules and principles
of the law.
In less than fifty-eight years of his life upon this
earth Judge Treanor achieved distinction as a student, a
teacher, a soldier, and a jurist. Few men, even those attaining a rich fullness of years, achieve a fraction of his accomplishments. His life well exemplifies the truth of the
lines:
"We live in
In feelings,
We should
Who thinks

deeds, not years; in thoughts, not breaths;
not in figures on a dial.
count time by heart-throbs. He most lives
most, feels the noblest, acts the best."

Indiana is proud of the judges it has had and which it
has upon this Bench. Judge Treanor has taken his rank with
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the best of them. His portrait now takes its place among the
portraits of those other fine judges whose characters and
capabilities have contributed to establish the eminence of this
Court. The artist has done his work well. There is more, in
this picture of Judge Treanor, than mere superficial resemblance. The skill of the artist enables the essential qualities of the man, those for which we loved and admired him,
to shine forth from his painted likeness. The portrait is
worthy of its subject. To say this is to bestow the highest
possible meed of praise. There is no worthier place for it
than here among the portraits of these other splendid men.
The subject of the portrait is worthy of honor in any place.
On behalf of the Court, Honorable Evan A. Evans,
the Senior Circuit Judge of the Seventh Circuit, repsonded
as follows:
MEMBERS OF THE BAR OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND FRIENDS

OF JUDGE TREANOR:
On behalf of the Court, I wish to express our appreciation of your generous action in presenting this life-like portrait of our late beloved friend and associate, Judge Walter
E. Treanor. We gratefully accept it. It will be hung in an
appropriate place.
It is, indeed, a most generous course which the Bar of
this Court has followed for many years, of presenting portraits, oil paintings of high artistic quality, of each judge
who has sat on this bench. We are fortunate, too, in having
such a lobby wherein these portraits may be hung.
Personally, I like this portrait very much. I have looked
upon it at least a dozen times, before and since it was completed. I am more than satisfied with it. Through it, Judge
Treanor seems to speak to us, and we can almost talk to him.
We are pleased that you have honored Judge Treanor.
Satisfaction is deep and genuine when a favorite friend, living or dead, is recognized and honored.
Our friend's life is so well known and has been so admirably stated by you who presented the memorials, that I
shall add little. Yet, I feel the urge to say what is in my
heart and on my tongue.
Simple, sincere, and conscientious was this associate
who worked with us from January, 1938, to April, 1941. The
number of these years was all too short, but long enough to
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endear him to us. Sweet and companionable, human and
cheery-he had an unusually good sense of proportion. He
possessed a sense of humor. He did not take himself too
seriously. He wore well.
Thoroughly grounded and mature in his judgments of
law and other public questions when he came to us, his
opinions were, from the first, appreciated and sought.
Judge Treanor served eight years upon the Supreme
Court of Indiana, and participated in 907 cases. He came to
this court, therefore, a seasoned jurist. He was a member
of this court for three and one-third years during which
he sat in 380 cases.
Briefly told, the story of Judge Treanor is,-schooling
and teaching. More schooling and more teaching. College
and university courses. More teaching. Interruption while
serving his country over seas in the World War. Two years
did he thus give to his country. Then post-graduate university courses in law; then professor of law in a great
university---eight years of it. Then membership on a great
state supreme court, eight years more. Then he was selected
for membership on this court.
He was chosen on his record alone, without political
participation, prestige or influence. His appointment was
unsought and unexpected by him. It was an honor to a deserving humble official,-a kind of a judicial appointment
which honored both the appointer and the appointee.
Each year of his life he was a little better equipped.
Every half decade found him a little higher up the ladder
of success; always placed there by others in appreciation of
him. Every position he occupied, he well deserved . Each
position he honored. Promotion never spoiled him. He was
always the same-his feet on the ground, his eyes kindly,
but his gaze steady and unflinching. How often his joyous
laughter bespoke the sunny, optimistic nature which was
ever his.
His views on public questions, legal and economic, were
liberal. Not slavishly devoted to a fetish, he was nevertheless constant and loyal to his convictions. Surprisingly
tenacious was this most modest man. Where convictions were
strong, he was firm. He sought to convince, yet not to
harshly offend.
This is no time to discuss divisions of opinion among
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courts of the land. Suffice is it to say of our court, or of
any court composed of a plurality of judges, that its strength
lies, not in the unanimity of its views, nor in the similarity
of the political or social convictions of its members.
Rather, both its wisdom and the extent of its influence
are traceable largely to the variety of the opinions of its
members. Differences of opinion, of experiences, of habits,
of ages, of early training and inheritances,-all contribute
to the broader composite judgment of a court. They make
for its greater wisdom and for a better court. Where all
members entertain the same views and observe from the same
viewpoint, the objectives are always alike. They carry but
one color. A Court so constituted lives next door to the noisy
Bigotry family.
Judge Treanor brought his views, his varied experiences,
his individual studies of public and private questions with
him to this court. He helped to broaden the vision of the
rest of us.
Notwithstanding all our pleasant recollections, the occasion is a sad one to each of us. Writing the last chapter of
a book, even though it be a glorious story, carries an implication of defeat. Coming so early in Judge Treanor's life,
when he was at the height of his mental powers and his
career, it clouds a loving tribute to a friend.
It is thus, that
We must gently close the book
And place it in a favorite nook
"He fought a noble fight
"He battled for the right
"He has won the fadeless crown."
Gently, tenderly, close the book.

